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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CoNFESSION

OF A FOURTEEN-YEAR-OLD HELD

NOT To CONTRAVENE DUE PROCESS; AVAILABILITY OF CoRAM NOBIS WHEN
CONVICTION RESTS ON GUILTY PLEA OF A JUVENILE LEFT UNANSWERED

On March 15, 1947, detectives of the Albany police department received
certain information relating to the sensational murder of an eight-year-old boy.
This information led to the home of petitioner, a boy who had not yet reached
the age of fifteen. The police advised his parents that the boy was wanted for
questioning; the subject matter of such questioning was not revealed. While
driving petitioner to police headquarters, the police asked him what he had
done with the clothes of the deceased boy. Petitioner's response was that he
had thrown them in the creek. The police then drove the boy to the District
Attorney's office where a full confession followed. Subsequent to the confession,
petitioner's parents learned that their son's questioning involved a murder
charge. Their requests to see petitioner were denied until just prior to the
preliminary hearing when a short visit was permitted. Subsequent visits were
denied until the day of petitioner's indictment. On arraignment for the indictment of first degree murder, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner and
counsel was assigned. After many conferences with his parents and assigned
counsel, petitioner withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty
to second degree murder. The reduced plea was accepted by the court and
petitioner was sentenced accordingly. After sixteen years of imprisonment, he
filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis vacating and setting aside the
judgment of conviction rendered on his plea of guilty.1 The basis for relief was
that he was denied due process of law because his guilty plea was based on
and induced by a confession that because of his tender years was in effect
coerced. In a 4-3 decision the Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not
denied due process of law; that the circumstances surrounding his confession
"were fully explored in the coram nobis hearing and sympathetically considered, from the totality of which the only rational conclusion [was] that the
confession was voluntary. . .

."

The Court also found that the acceptance of

the guilty plea to a reduced charge was a humane disposition of the case in
light of the possibility of a first degree murder conviction and the mandatory
death sentence. Thus disposing of the due process question, the Court proceeded to question the propriety of granting a coram nobis hearing to a
defendant who, except for his age, falls squarely within the rule that a
2
knowingly and voluntarily entered guilty plea precludes coram nobis relief.
The Court's discussion of the coram nobis issue is ambiguous and its determination, if any, remains unclear. People v. DeFlumer, 16 N.Y.2d 20, 209
N.E.2d 93, 261 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1965).
1. United States ex rel. DeFlumer v. LaVallee, 216 F. Supp. 137, 140 (N.D.N.Y. 1963),
wherein petitioner in the instant case was denied habeas corpus on the ground of "lack of a
sufficient showing that the state remedies had been exhausted."
2.

People v. Nicholson, 11 N.Y.2d 1067, 184 N.E.2d 190, 230 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1962).

The words knowingly and voluntarily are more perplexing than definitive.
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The major issue presented by the instant case does not involve the frequent
challenge to the admissability into evidence of a coerced confession. What
petitioner contends is that his guilty plea was involuntary because the court
in accepting it "knew of the circumstances of the confession and its influence
in inducing the plea deprived him of due process of law. ' 3 The question
presented is more dearly illustrated by petitioner's assigned counsel's statement at the time of acceptance of his guilty plea:
When the assignment reached me, of course, there had been a confession; a confession by this juvenile taken late at night on the day
that this offense occurred, without the aid of counsel, and without
the guidance of parents, and I searched that I might be able to find
there was no inflexible rule of law which would prevent me from
attacking, at least, the legality of such a confession. But I found to
everymy amazement I could get no comfort from the law, because
4
thing was measured by the standard of adult responsibility.
The question of the propriety of the adult standard as applied to juveniles was
soon answered by the Supreme Court. In 1948 the Court decided Haley v.
Ohio,5 where the confession of a fifteen-year old boy, who had been told of his
constitutional right to remain silent, was held involuntary. The Supreme Court
stated,
when . . . a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before us,
special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender
and difficult age for a boy . . . .He cannot be judged by the more
exacting standards of maturity .... He needs counsel and support if
he is not to become the victim first of fear, then of panic. He needs
someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the law,
as he knows it, crush him.6
The Court added that even if told of his rights it can't be assumed that a
fifteen-year old boy would have a full appreciation of them. In Gallegos v.
Colorado,7 the Supreme Court stated that:
a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have
any conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible
only to the police.... He cannot be compared with an adult in full
possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his
admissions. . . . Without some adult protection against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be 8able to know, let alone
assert, such constitutional rights as he had.
The Supreme Court has held that a conviction, following a trial or a guilty
plea, based on a coerced confession is invalid under the due process clause.0
3. People v. DeFlumer, 16 N.Y.2d 20, 23, 209 N.E.2d 93, 95, 261 N.Y.S.2d 42, 45 (1965).
4. Id. at 23, 209 N.E.2d at 94-95, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (1965).
5.

332 U.S. 596 (1948).

6.
7.
8.
9.

Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948).
370 U.S. 49 (1962).
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962).
E.g., Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 118 (1956); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.

227 (1940).
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In another case monition was given that the trial judge always has the duty
of making a determination according to correct constitutional standards. 10
Very recently the Supreme Court has affirmed the retroactive application of
coerced confession grounds establishing denials of due process." The New
York Court of Appeals has been in accord with these Supreme Court determinations. In 1961 it reversed the 1943 conviction of a thirteen-year old
based on a plea of guilty where it was revealed that he had been denied due
process. In its decision the Court stated, ". . . in 1943, when the mere possibility of a conviction of a child for murder was shocking to contemplate, the
taking of a guilty plea of murder from so young a defendant called for an extreme measure of caution and at least certainty of guilt and of the complete
absence of any plausible defense."' 2 In accord is People v. Serranto,13 where the
Court reversed a conviction of an adult based on a guilty plea where it was
apparent to the Court that there remained doubt as to defendant's guilt. In
People v. Oliver'4 the Court of Appeals dismissed the indictment against a
fourteen year old boy charged with murder. This 1945 indictment was found
to be against public and legislative policy manifest at the time of the crime.
From analysis of the above decisions it is apparent that the Constitution
prohibits determining the voluntariness of the confession of a juvenile by
resort to the standard of adult responsibility and maturity. It is also apparent
that where the standard used denies defendant due process of law, his conviction, notwithstanding a plea of guilty, cannot stand.
The second issue raised is whether a juvenile defendant can contest a
due process violation in New York by the post conviction remedy of coram
nobis, when his conviction rests on a plea of guilty. Coram nobis is the traditional remedy for setting aside a judgment where facts unknown at the time
of trial, if known, would have affected the verdict. 15 Thus where the error
was apparent on the record, coram nobis did not lie.' 6 The remedy is one of
paramount importance in New York where habeas corpus has narrow applicability. Habeas corpus in New York state courts is limited to cases where the
court rendering the judgment lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or over
the offense charged. 17 Beyond jurisdictional error its availability is questionable. "The New York version of coram nobis was born in Lyons v. Goldstein."'8 The Court held that it had inherent power to reopen a judgment
based on trickery, deceit, coercion and fraud or misrepresentation in procure10.
11.
12.
457, 459
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
L. Rev.

Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 548 (1961).
Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
People v. Codarre, 10 N.Y.2d 361, 365, 179 N.E.2d 475, 476-77, 223 N.Y.S.2d
(1961).
15 N.Y.2d 304, 206 N.,.2d 330, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1965).
People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d 152, 134 N.E.2d 197, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1956).

Frank, Coram Nobis (1953) Pars. 1.01-1.04.
People v. Sullivan, 3 N.Y.2d 196, 144 N.E.2d 6, 165 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1957).
Morhous v. N.Y. Supreme Court, 293 N.Y. 131, 56 N.E.2d 79 (1944).
Paulsen, Winds of Change: Criminal Procedure in New York 1941-1965, 15 Buffalo
297, 309 (1965).
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ment of the plea upon which the judgment was based.') Immediately following
Lyons, the Court of Appeals held that the proper remedy to question denials
of due process of law was a motion to vacate the judgments made in the court
which granted it.20 In New York such remedy is a motion for writ of error
coram nobis. In the case of People v. Sullivan,21 coram nobis was held to be
the emergency measure whereby a defendant could avoid the effects of an
unlawful conviction when all other avenues of judicial relief were closed to
him. In the area of coerced confessions, coram nobis was considered the proper
motion when a defendant required Jackson-Denno relief. 22 These decisions of
the Court of Appeals pointed to coram nobis as the motion to compensate for
the limited availability of habeas corpus. However, recent decisions of the
Court, with rare exception, have all but limited coram nobis to its traditional
scope.23 Where a defendant knowingly and voluntarily enters a plea of guilty
he is precluded from coram nobis relief, though he contends a coerced confession induced such plea.24 The Appellate Division in the instant case made it
clear that youth is no exception to the above rule.25 Such clarity is lost in the
Court of Appeals decision and final determination on this exception by the
Court must wait.26 The scope of coram nobis in New York, in relation to both
juveniles and adults, remains undefined. Probably the most elucidating statement of its scope was made by Chief Judge Desmond. He stated that, "because
of the distinctions heretofore made and now being made as to various post
conviction remedies in criminal cases, no clear rule or rules exist and each
case must be decided according to its own equities. '27 It has been stated that
"the New York Court of Appeals has not fulfilled its duty under the federal
constitution to provide state prisoners with a state remedy to vindicate all
federal constitutional rights."128 Unless the dissenting statement of Judge Burke
in the instant case, that "coram nobis is the appropriate remedy where a
defendant has been denied due process of law," becomes a judicial reality in
New York, redress will have to be left to the federal courts. 20 The availability of
such redress has been both clarified and expanded by the Supreme Court in
Fay v. Noia,30 where the Court stated that, "if the States withhold effective
19. Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943).
20. Morhous v. N.Y. Supreme Court, 293 N.Y. 131, 56 N.E.2d 79 (1944).
21. 3 N.Y.2d 196, 144 N.E.2d 6, 165 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1957).
22. People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965).
23. People v. Griffin, 16 N.Y.2d 508, 208 N.E.2d 179, 260 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1965);
People v. Rogers, 15 N.Y.2d 690, 204 N.E.2d 334, 256 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1965); People v.
Nicholson, 11 N.Y.2d 1067, 184 N.E.2d 190, 230 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1962); People v. Shapiro,
3 N.Y.2d 203, 144 N.E.2d 12, 165 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1957).
24. People v. Nicholson, 11 N.Y.2d 1067, 184 N.E.2d 190, 230 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1962).
25. People v. DeFlumer, 21 A.D.2d 959, 251 N.Y.S.2d 814 (3d Dep't 1964).
26. People v. DeFlumer, 16 N.Y.2d 20, 209 N.E.2d 93, 261 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1965).
27. People v. Sullivan, 3 N.Y.2d 196, 144 N.E.2d 6, 165 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1957) (Desmond
C.J., concurring).
28. Paulsen, supra note 18, at 312.
29. People v. DeFlumer, 16 N.Y.2d 20, 23, 209 N.E.2d 93, 95, 261 N.Y.S.2d 42, 45
(1965) (Burke J., dissenting).
30. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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remedy [for denials of due process], the federal courts have the power and
'31
the duty to provide it."
Petitioner first sought relief in the federal courts through habeas corpus.
Relief was denied on the ground that petitioner failed to show that the state
court remedies had been exhausted. 32 A coram nobis hearing was granted by
the New York County Court. The court held that petitioner's youth excepted
him from the general rule that a plea of guilty waives the right to coram
nobis relief. In determining the voluntariness of the confession and its effect
on the subsequent plea of guilty, the court proceeded on the proposition that
petitioner was entitled to the same constitutional standards as if the case arose
today. In light of petitioner's youth, the evidence introduced on his behalf
was treated as establishing a prima facie case and the burden of proof shifted
to the people. Determining the standard for adjudging the voluntariness of
the confession, the court stated that though petitioner was below fifteen years
of age, he was successfully going through the first year of high school and
was an average student; that he remained composed and showed no signs of
nervousness through the questioning period; and that he was not an immature
panicky child. The time between the initial police directed questioning and the
confession was disputed. The court considered the present prominant positions
held in the community by the then District Attorney and Assistant District
Attorney, the reliability of the testimony of retired police officers and concluded the time interim was quite reasonable. The court felt that the competence of petitioner's assigned counsel could not be questioned. He was an
attorney of prominence, who later became a judge and a prime mover in the
establishment of the children's court. The relevance of the denials of parental
requests to see the child were considered. The court stated that since the requests were subsequent to the confession their denial was irrelevant. The
county court denied the relief sought, holding the confession voluntary and
therefore no violation of due process. 33 The Appellate Division affirmed the
order denying relief, adding alternative grounds. It agreed with the county
court's determination on voluntariness and with the standard applied. However, the Appellate Division also determined that on the record it could not
reasonably be found, no matter how the statements were made, that they forced
or coerced the guilty plea. The court proceeded to differ with the county court
and thereby found a further ground for denying relief. The court held that the
petitioner's youth was no exception to the Nicholson rule, that a knowingly
and voluntarily entered guilty plea precludes coram nobis and other post conviction remedies, though such plea be induced by a coerced confession. It
therefore found that coram nobis relief would be denied in any event.3 4 The
Court of Appeals affirmed in a 4-3 decision and dismissed the writ of error. The
31. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963).
32. United States ex rel. DeFlumer v. LaVallee, 216 F. Supp. 137, 140 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
33. People v. DeFlumer, 40 Misc. 2d 732, 243 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Albany County Ct. 1963).
34. People v. DeFlumer, 21 A.D.2d 959, 251 N.Y.S.2d 814 (3d Dep't 1964).
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majority opinion upheld the fairness of the coram nobis hearing and concurred
in its result as to voluntariness. It also considered that under the standards of
due process existing at the time, the judge, in accepting the plea, followed
a humane course of action. Finding "the plea was voluntary and deliberate and
made with the single purpose of avoiding the risks incident to a trial on the
indictment" the Court held that there was no denial of due process of law. The
majority then treated the question of the availability of coram nobis to a juvenile
defendant whose conviction rests on a plea of guilty. This portion of the opinion
is so ambiguous that no determination is discernible. The Court seems to limit
its treatment of the issue to a restatement of defense counsel's distinguishing
argument of age and a statement of contrary considerations. However, from the
tone of the opinion, it is probable that the Court would, if it was required to,
deny the defense counsel's argument that youth is an exception to the Nicholson rule.3 5 Thus the county court's grant of a coram nobis hearing delayed determination of the coram nobis issue by affording the Court the due process ground
for decision. Judge Burke took issue with the majority stating that "the guilty plea
of this defendant cannot stand on proceedings wherein all concerned in a mistaken
belief applied prohibited constitutional standards . . . ,,30 The fact that two
weeks prior to the acceptance of petitioner's plea the Supreme Court had
granted certiorari in the case of Haley v. Ohio, involving the applicability of
adult standards to a juvenile, should have put the accepting judge on notice. It
is also pertinent that seven months later that case decided that adult standards
were inapplicable. Judge Burke felt that the court after having its attention
focused on the presence and forcing effect of the confession should have either
rejected the plea or at least taken it under advisement. He also felt that the
court should have taken notice of the earnest discussions of the legislature on a
proposed bill to abolish the trying of children between seven and fifteen for
homicide. The bill was passed in 1948 too late to have effect on petitioner. Judge
Burke also said that notice should have been taken of the strong public criticism
of the existing law made apparent in its reaction to an unreported 1946 decision
in Queens County. The Judge concluded that the standard applied to petitioner's
confession by all previous courts concerned denied him his fundamental rights.
Differing from the majority, Judge Burke also treated the Nicholson rule directly.
He distinguished the instant case from Nicholson on the ground that in the
instant case as opposed to Nicholson the convicting judge was made plainly
aware by defense counsel of the need for caution in accepting a plea based on
the tainted legality of the confession of a juvenile. Chief Judge Desmond in a
separate dissent concurred with Judge Burke, adding specific New York precedents. Reference was made to a similar case in 1945. Defendant there was
fortunate enough to have had his case postponed and thereby have the Court
apply, not the 1948 amendment, but the legislative policies and gubernatorial
35. People v. DeFlumer, 16 N.Y.2d 20, 209 N.E.2d 93, 261 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1965).
36. Id. at 24, 209 N.E.2d at 95, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 46 (1965) (Burke J., dissenting).
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statements accompanying it that condemned indictments of juveniles for homicide.87 Judge Desmond saw great inequity in dismissing the indictment there
and affirming the conviction here.38
In 1943 New York enacted a statute prohibiting the trial of children below
the age of fifteen as adults for all criminal charges except those mandating a life
sentence or state execution. The legislature felt that the public was not yet ready
to eliminate the trial of juveniles for the heinous crimes requiring such harsh
punishment.8 9 During the ensuing years a change in public opinion became
apparent. In the 1946 unreported case of People v. Turk the public and even the
prosecuting attorney expressed their repulsion to the irreparable harm and
exposure accompanying the trial of a child for homicide.40 This attitude of the
special treatment of children came to a head in the confession area when two
weeks before the arraignment of the petitioner in the instant case the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the conviction of a fifteen year old based on a
confession judged on adult standards of maturity. The decision in that case
denied the application of adult standards to a juvenile, but was handed down a
few months too late for DeFlumer. 41 It was also clear that for two years prior to
the enactment of the 1948 amendment to the penal law, prohibiting the trial of
children below fifteen years of age for homicide, the legislature was engaged
in earnest discussion as to the propriety of such juvenile trials. 42 The statutory
amendment was passed too late to be applicable to DeFlumer and was held not
retroactive. 43 These circumstances illustrate the trend in the treatment of
juveniles when the petitioner was brought before the arraigning judge. Seemingly
unattentive to the pervading atmosphere of the times, the judge considered
petitioner's confession and its possible adverse effects at trial by adult standards.
Applying this standard the judge's acceptance of a guilty plea to a reduced
charge was apparently a humane disposition. However, there is no doubt that
the adult standard is not the measurement of voluntariness applicable to the
confession of a juvenile and that the trial judge ignored circumstances requiring judicial notice and acted under a mistaken belief in applying the adult
standard. 44 No matter how humane the trial judge's disposition and no matter
how sympathetic the county court was in considering the confession of this
juvenile, they applied a standard of maturity the Supreme Court has held
inapplicable to a juvenile. It is clear from the Supreme Court opinions in the
37.

People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d 152, 162, 134 N.E.2d 197, 204, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367, 374

(1956).
38.

People v. DeFlumer, 16 N.Y.2d 20, 26, 209 N.E.2d 93, 96, 261 N.Y.S.2d 42, 47

(1965) (Desmond C.J., dissenting).
39. N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 486, 2186.
2 7
40. N.Y. State Legislative Annual, 1948, p. 1 ; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1948, ch. 554; N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1949, ch. 388, § 2186.
41. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
42. N.Y. State Legislative Annual, 1948, p.217.
43. People v. Keitt, 31 Misc. 2d 931, 222 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1961); People
v. Downie, 205 Misc. 643, 130 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Kings County Ct. 1954).
44. See People v. DeFlumer, 16 N.Y.2d 20, 24, 209 N.E.2d 93, 95, 261 N.Y.S.2d 42, 47
(1965) (Burke J., dissenting).
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Haley45 and Gallegos4" cases that the voluntariness of a confession of a juvenile
cannot be adjudged on the more exacting standard of maturity. The county
court's words conflict with these Supreme Court precedents. In considering the
evidence the county court stated
.' in many respects this defendant was mature for his age even
though -he was still a couple of weeks short of attaining his 15th birthday. It cannot logically be argued that the same standard should have
been applied to him as to . ..one who lacked the composure and
relative poise demonstrated by this defendant. . ..47
This statement cannot be reconciled with the statement of the Supreme Court
that "a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any
conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible only to the
police." 48 The county court attributed to this fourteen year old boy maturity
not found in children of what the Supreme Court described as the "difficult age
for a boy." 49 The confession procured from a boy below fifteen years of age
in the absence of parents, friends or counsel should be held to contravene the due
process guarantees and a plea of guilty resting on the fear of its use in a
criminal trial should be adjudged coerced.5 0 "[A] new trial is now impossible and
the only way of dealing with this situation (18 years' imprisonment for a 15year-old boy) is to reverse, grant the petition and dismiss the indictment.5 ' In
the contrary determination of the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals, there
is no authority cited and no attempt made to distinguish the Supreme Court
precedents noted above. Quaere, what if the Court of Appeals had found a
denial of due process, would petitioner's guilty plea have precluded coram nobis
relief? The case that stands for the rule that a knowingly and voluntarily
entered plea of guilty precludes coram nobis and all other post conviction
remedies is People v. Nicholson.52 In its essence Nicholson denies a defendant
all avenues of redress for constitutional deprivations underlying a plea of guilty.
The Court of Appeals devoted all of one page to this vastly important decision.
One commentator has recently challenged the basis for the Nicholson rule. "It is
difficult to see how an inquiry into the issue of coercion is properly blocked
by offering a plea of guilty which itself was produced by the very illegality which
inquiry might establish.153 The failure of New York courts to afford a defendant remedies for constitutional violations when his conviction rests on a
guilty plea is in effect a delegation to the federal courts. The district court in
45.
46.

Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962).
47. People v. DeFlumer, 40 Misc. 2d 732, 738, 243 N.Y.S.2d 893, 898-99 (Albany

County Ct. 1963).

48. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962).
49. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
50. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (by implication).
51. People v. DeFlumer, 16 N.Y.2d 20, 26, 209 N.E.2d 93, 97, 261 N.Y.S.2d 42, 47
(1965) (Desmond CJ., dissenting).
52. 11 N.Y.2d 1067, 184 N.E.2d 190, 230 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1962).
53. Paulsen, supra note 18, at 308.
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the instant case stated that it would take jurisdiction if the state court remedies
were exhausted. 54 It denied jurisdiction considering that "if this [district]
court has jurisdiction, it would seem that the state court should also assume
it."5 5 The district court also stated "it cannot be assumed that this fourteen
year old defendant waived a violation of his constitutional rights nor can he
be charged with any failure to overrule the decision of his experienced counsel
which was prompted by his understanding of the decisions then available to
him."5 6 If the Appellate Division decision on the coram nobis issue is to become
or is the law in New York, the district court assumptions fall by the wayside. It
would follow that if the federal court grants jurisdiction the New York courts
might not, and that a fourteen year old can waive violations of his constitutional
rights for failure to overrule the decision of his experienced counsel. It is clear
from the presence of the Nicholson rule that New York has not fulfilled its
obligation to afford remedies that will rectify constitutional deprivations. It can
be said that the duty placed on the trial judge in New York in accepting a plea
of guilty, to determine the absence of a plausible defense and the certainty of
guilt,57 makes the Nicholson rule more palatable. This must presume however
that the trial judge is infallible, for his decision is final in relation to the
availability of post conviction remedies. In the instant case, assuming the
presence of a coerced confession inducing the petitioner to plead guilty and the
Appellate Division's denial of coram nobis as the law, where is this juvenile's
remedy for a violation of his constitutional rights? Quaere whether the trial
judge's duty makes a denial of relief above any more palatable. The defense
counsel did not clearly allege nor did the courts consider the possible denials of
right to counsel and the failure of law enforcement officers to advise petitioner of
his constitutional right to remain silent. The New York courts require that a
defendant be advised of his right to counsel and privilege to remain silent upon
arraignment and preliminary hearing.58 Also, any secret interrogation of the
defendant, from and after the finding of the indictment, without the protection
afforded by counsel has been held fundamentally unfair.59 The question raised
by the instant case is whether this juvenile defendant had a right to counsel and
to be advised of his privilege to remain silent when he was taken into police
custody and his interrogation because accusatorial. The Supreme Court in
Escobedo v. Illinois 60 held
that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatorywhen its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confes54. United States ex rel. DeFlumer v. LaVallee, 216 F. Supp. 137 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
55. Id. at 140.
56. Id. at 140.
57. People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 206 N.E.2d 330, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1965); People
v. Codarre, 10 N.Y.2d 361, 179 N.E.2d 475, 223 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1961).
58. Birzon, Kasanof & Forma, The Right to Counsel and the Indigent Accused in
Courts of Criminal Jurisdictionin New York State, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 428, 430 (1965).
59. People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).
60. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
sion-our adversary system begins to operate, and,
must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.6 1

. . .

the accused

New York represents those jurisdictions that construe the Escobedo decision
strictly. New York requires the defendant to request counsel before his constitutional rights arise. 62 California illustrates the liberal interpretation of Escobedo. In cases brought before its courts, where' the necessary factors described in
Escobedo are present, California places an affirmative duty on its law enforcement officers to advise the accused of his right to counsel and privilege to
remain silent.63 The question as to which interpretation will be the correct
constitutional guarantee will soon be decided by the Supreme Court.'1 There
seems no cogent reason in a society like ours to require a man, no less a
juvenile, to request a right guaranteed him by the Constitution. In the case of a
fifteen year old boy, as the Supreme Court in Haley considered, not even the
mere advisement of his constitutional rights is enough.6 5 A juvenile must be
afforded more protection than the mere statement of rights that he cannot be
expected to fully understand. If the Supreme Court decides that request is
necessary under the Escobedo decision, 66 petitioner has still been denied due
process of law. The instant case has been summed up quite well by Professor
Paulsen in a recent article: "Without much doubt the confession was taken in
violation of constitutional standards as they are understood today. . . .It is
hard to see, in these circumstances, how a guilty plea should block the assessment of the underlying confession in collateral proceedings."' 67
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